



Process Safety Overview

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





Process safety resources

D. A. Crowl and J. F. Louvar 2001. *Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications, 2nd Ed.*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

CCPS 2007a. Center for Chemical Process Safety, *Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety*, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers







Process safety resources

CCPS 2008a. Center for Chemical Process Safety, *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition*, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.

CCPS 2008b. Center for Chemical Process Safety, *Incidents that Define Process Safety*, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.






Process safety resources

Johnson et al. 2003. *Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards*, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, accessible free after registration on www.knovel.com

CCPS 2001. Center for Chemical Process Safety, “Reactive Material Hazards: What You Need To Know,” NY: American Institute of Chem. Engineers, www.aiche.org/uploadedFiles/CCPS/Resources/SafetyAlerts/reactmat.pdf





Process Safety Overview

- 1. What is “Process Safety”?**
- 2. Opposite of process safety: Major incidents**
- 3. The basic anatomy of process safety incidents**
- 4. Overview of process safety strategies**
- 5. Taking advantage of past experience**
- 6. Defense in depth / layers of protection**
- 7. Elements of process safety management**



Process Safety Overview

1. What is “Process Safety”?





“Process Safety”

= the absence of loss and harm at process facilities by

- (a) identifying process hazards,**
- (b) containing and controlling them,**
- (c) countering abnormal situations with effective safeguards.**

(Activity-focused definition)



Process Safety Overview

1. What is “Process Safety”?
2. **Opposite of process safety: Major incidents**



Some major process incidents

- **Seveso, Italy (July 1976)**
 - Runaway reaction
 - 2 kg of dioxin release from relief system
 - Over 17 km² affected
 - Locally grown food banned for several months
 - Several inches of topsoil removed, incinerated
 - 80,000 animals died or slaughtered
 - Plant shut down and destroyed
 - EU “Seveso Directive” prompted



See CCPS 2008b for details of these incidents



Some major process incidents


- **Bhopal, India (December 1984)**
 - Pesticide production facility
 - Water introduced into methyl isocyanate storage
 - MIC toxic vapor release from vent system
 - 2000 to 3000 early fatalities; ~200,000 injuries
 - Plant shut down; Union Carbide eventually sold
 - Seveso II, EPA Risk Management Program prompted





Some major process incidents

- **Texas City, Texas (March 2005)**
 - Refinery isomerization unit
 - One valve not opened during unit re-start
 - Release of hot flammable material from blowdown
 - Ignition and vapor cloud explosion
 - 15 fatalities, 170+ injuries; BP losses and impacts








Process Safety Overview

1. What is “Process Safety”?
2. Opposite of process safety: Major incidents
- 3. The basic anatomy of process safety incidents**



Loss Events



- **Fatalities**
- **Injuries**
- **Environ. Damage**
- **Property Damage**
- **Evacuations**
- **Business Losses**
- **Plant Closings**
- **Fines, Lawsuits**



Key Definition

Loss Event:

Point of time in an abnormal situation when an irreversible physical event occurs that has the potential for loss and harm impacts.

– CCPS 2008a Glossary

Examples:

- Hazardous material release
- Flammable vapor or dust cloud ignition
- Tank or vessel overpressurization rupture



Key Questions

- **Why** do Loss Events happen?
- **How** do Loss Events happen?
- **What** must be done to avoid them?



WHY do Loss Events happen?


- **We choose to handle dangerous process materials and energies**
 - To make a living
 - To provide society with desirable products
- **As long as we choose to handle them, a potential for loss events exists**





Analogy

- **We choose to handle dangerous animals at the Zoo**
 - To make a living
 - To provide society with desirable experiences
- **As long as we choose to handle them, a potential for loss events exists**
 - Things can be done to reduce their likelihood and severity to negligible or tolerable levels





“Process Safety”



The absence of loss and harm at process facilities by

- (a) identifying process hazards,**
- (b) containing and controlling them,**
- (c) countering abnormal situations with effective safeguards.**



Inherent Characteristics

*Presence of a
stored or connected
material or energy with
inherent characteristics
having the potential for
causing loss or harm.*





Three Types of Process Hazards

- **Material hazard:** A contained or connected process material with one or more hazardous characteristics
- Energy hazard
- Chemical interaction hazard




Material Hazards

Inherently hazardous characteristics:



Flammability



Instability



Toxicity



Corrosivity





Three Types of Process Hazards

- Material hazard
- **Energy hazard: Some form of physical energy contained within or connected to the process with the potential for loss or harm**
- Chemical interaction hazard



Process Hazard

Presence of a
stored or connected
material or energy with
inherent characteristics
having the potential for
causing loss or harm.



Form of Energy with Injury Potential (examples)

Electrical (voltage, capacitance)

Mechanical (spring, machine parts)

Kinetic (moving or rotating mass)

Positional (elevated part or equipment)

Hydraulic (liquid under pressure)

Pneumatic (gas/vapor under pressure)

Chemical–Health Hazard (NFPA 2 to 4)

Chemical–Flammables (NFPA 3 or 4)

Chemical–Combustibles (NFPA 2)

Chemical–Reactive (NFPA 2 to 4)

Thermal–Hot Material (steam, hot oil)

Thermal–Cryogenic Fluid (liquid N₂)



Three Types of Process Hazards

- Material hazard
- Energy hazard
- **Chemical interaction hazard:**
Presence of materials with the potential for loss or harm upon their interaction in an unintentional or uncontrolled manner



Reactive Interactions

Example Compatibility Chart for an Acetic Anhydride Handling Facility


<i>Will These Two Materials React?</i>	Acetic Acid	Acetic Anhydride	Cooling Water	Sulfuric Acid	50% Caustic	Lube Oil	Cleaning Solution
Acetic Acid							
Acetic Anhydride	<i>Reactive</i>						
Cooling Water	<i>Not reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>					
Concentrated Sulfuric Acid	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>				
50% Caustic	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>			
Lube Oil	<i>Not reactive</i>	<i>Not reactive</i>	<i>Not reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>	<i>Reactive</i>		
Cleaning Solution	<i>Find out what the cleaning solution contains, then determine reactions</i>						

From CCPS 2001



Process Hazard


*Presence of a
stored or connected
material or energy with
inherent characteristics
having the potential for
causing loss or harm.*





Degree of Hazard

- More hazardous material
→ *greater degree of hazard*
- Farther from zero energy state
→ *greater degree of hazard*





Key Questions

- Why do Loss Events happen?
- **How** do Loss Events happen?
- What must be done to avoid them?



Incident Sequence: *Initiating Cause*


- *(Hazard)*
- ***Cause***
 - *Deviation*
 - *Loss Event*
 - *Impacts*





Normal Operation

Hazards



During normal operation, all **hazards** are contained and controlled, *but they are still present.*



Incident Sequence: *Initiating Cause*


- *(Hazard)*
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Initiating Cause

Every incident starts with an *initiating cause* (also called an *initiating event* or just a “*cause*”).




Example initiating causes:

- Feed pump fails off
- Procedural step omitted
- Truck runs into process piping
- Wrong raw material is received
- Extreme low ambient temperature



Initiating Cause

Once an *initiating cause* occurs, normal operation cannot continue without a process or operational response.





Incident Sequence: *Deviation*


- *(Hazard)*
 - *Cause*
 - ***Deviation***
 - *Loss Event*
 - *Impacts*





Deviation

The immediate result of an initiating cause is a *deviation*.



Cause

Deviation

- No Flow
- Low Temperature
- High Pressure
- Less Material Added
- Excess Impurities
- Transfer to Wrong Tank
- Loss of Containment
- etc.




Abnormal Situations

- Most engineering focuses on designing a process to *work*:
“normal situation”
- We must also consider how a process can *fail*, starting with an
“abnormal situation”



Deviation

A ***deviation*** is an abnormal situation, outside defined design or operational parameters.



Cause

Deviation

- No Flow
- Low Temperature
- **High Pressure** (*exceed upper limit of normal range*)
- Less Material Added
- Excess Impurities
- Transfer to Wrong Tank
- Loss of Containment
- etc.



Incident Sequence: *Loss Event*


- *(Hazard)*
 - *Cause*
 - *Deviation*
 - ***Loss Event***
 - *Impacts*






Loss Event

A *loss event* will result if a deviation continues uncorrected and the process is not shut down.





Loss Event: Step Change in System Entropy




- Release
- Fire
- Explosion



Loss Event


Loss events may also be related to production or equipment failures.





Incident Sequence: *Impacts*


- *(Hazard)*
 - *Cause*
 - *Deviation*
 - *Loss Event*
 - ***Impacts***





Impacts


Impacts are the losses and injuries that can result from a loss event.





Impacts

There are often other, less tangible impacts as well.






Incident Sequence Without Safeguards





Pyramid Principle of Process Safety

Major Catastrophe:
Multiple Fatalities
& Loss of Facility



Reducing the frequency of precursor events and near misses...




Pyramid Principle of Process Safety

Major Catastrophe:
Multiple Fatalities
& Loss of Facility



*... will reduce the
likelihood of a
major loss event*





Key Questions

- Why do Loss Events happen?
- How do Loss Events happen?
- **What** must be done to avoid Loss Events?



Process Safety Overview


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- 7. Elements of process safety management**

*What
must
be
done*



Overview of Process Safety Strategies

- **Inherent** - Hazard reduction
- **Passive** - Process or equipment design features that reduce risk without active functioning of any device
- **Active** - Engineering controls
- **Procedural** - Administrative controls





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Taking Advantage of Past Experience

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” - George Santayana

- **Learnings from past (usually bad) experiences have been embodied in various forms:**
 - **Regulations**
 - **Codes**
 - **Industry standards**
 - **Company standards**
 - **“Best practices”**
 - **Handbooks**
 - **Guidelines**
 - **Procedures**
 - **Checklists**
 - **Supplier Recommendations**



Taking Advantage of Past Experience

RAGAGEPS

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices

- Take advantage of wealth of experience
- Pass on accumulated knowledge
- Reduce recurrence of past incidents
- Enable uniformity of expectations
- Reduce liabilities when followed



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
Defense in Depth / Layers of Protection

- Also called “Safety Layers”
- Multiple layers may be needed, since no protection is 100% reliable
- Each layer must be designed to be effective
- Each layer must be maintained to be effective
- Some layers of protection are *contain and control measures*
- Other layers of protection are *safeguards*



Contain & Control

Contain & Control



Operational Mode: **Normal operation**

Objective: **Maintain normal operation;
keep hazards contained and controlled**

Examples of *Contain & Control*:


- Basic process control system
- Inspections, tests, maintenance
- Operator training
 - How to conduct a procedure or operate a process correctly and consistently
 - How to keep process within established limits
- Guards, barriers against external forces
- Management of change



“Layers of Protection”
between
hazards and
receptors

=

**“Defense
In Depth”**



COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION
(RELIEF DEVICES)

AUTOMATIC ACTION SIS OR ESD

CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR
SUPERVISION, AND MANUAL INTERVENTION

BASIC CONTROLS,
PROCESS ALARMS, AND
OPERATOR SUPERVISION

PROCESS
DESIGN



**Contain &
Control**



HAZARD

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION
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CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR
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BASIC CONTROLS,
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PROCESS
DESIGN



HAZARD

**Preventive
Safeguards**



Mitigative Safeguards

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (RELIEF DEVICES)

AUTOMATIC ACTION SIS OR ESD

CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR SUPERVISION, AND MANUAL INTERVENTION

BASIC CONTROLS, PROCESS ALARMS, AND OPERATOR SUPERVISION


PROCESS DESIGN



HAZARD




Safeguards: After Initiating Cause





Preventive Safeguards

Preventive



Operational Mode: **Abnormal operation**

Objective: **Regain control or shut down;
keep loss events from happening**


Examples of Preventive Safeguards:

- Operator response to alarm
- Safety Instrumented System
- Hardwired interlock
- Last-resort dump, quench, blowdown
- Emergency relief system



Mitigative Safeguards

Mitigative



Operational Mode: **Emergency**

Objective: **Minimize impacts**

Examples of Mitigative Safeguards:

- Sprinklers, monitors, deluge
- Emergency warning systems
- Emergency response
- Secondary containment; diking/curbing
- Discharge scrubbing, flaring, treatment
- Shielding, building reinforcement, haven
- Escape respirator, PPE



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PSM Elements Addressed in Our Industry Course

- Management systems
- Employee participation
- Process safety information
- Process hazard analysis
- Operating procedures
- Training
- Contractor safety
- Pre-startup safety reviews
- Mechanical integrity
- Safe work practices
- Management of change
- Emergency planning and response
- Incident investigation
- Compliance audits